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Abstract
Mechanism design without money has a rich history in social choice literature. Due to the
strong impossibility theorem by Gibbard and Satterthwaite, exploring domains in which there
exist dominant strategy mechanisms is one of the central questions in the field. We propose a
general framework, called the generalized packing problem (gpp), to study the mechanism design
questions without payment. The gpp possesses a rich structure and comprises a number of well-
studied models as special cases, including, e.g., matroid, matching, knapsack, independent set,
and the generalized assignment problem.
We adopt the agenda of approximate mechanism design where the objective is to design a
truthful (or strategyproof) mechanism without money that can be implemented in polynomial
time and yields a good approximation to the socially optimal solution. We study several special
cases of gpp, and give constant approximation mechanisms for matroid, matching, knapsack,
and the generalized assignment problem. Our result for generalized assignment problem solves
an open problem proposed in [15].
Our main technical contribution is in exploitation of the approaches from stable matching,
which is a fundamental solution concept in the context of matching marketplaces, in application
to mechanism design. Stable matching, while conceptually simple, provides a set of powerful
tools to manage and analyze self-interested behaviors of participating agents. Our mechanism
uses a stable matching algorithm as a critical component and adopts other approaches like
random sampling and online mechanisms. Our work also enriches the stable matching theory
with a new knapsack constrained matching model.
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1 Introduction
Algorithmic mechanism design is a fascinating field initiated by the seminal work of Nisan and
Ronen [23], which takes incentive preferences of self-interested agents into account for a multitude of
algorithmic challenges. One of the most beautiful designs is that of the VCG mechanism [30, 10, 19],
which computes an overall outcome, as well as an individual payment to each participating agent.
The VCG mechanism has two remarkable properties: social welfare optimization and incentive
compatibility (a.k.a., truthfulness, i.e., it is a dominant strategy for every agent to report his
private information to the mechanism).
The story is by no means over, however, due to the very limited applicability of the VCG
mechanisms. First, for a number of realistic problems, the computation of a socially optimal
outcome is intractable. Computational efficiency has been one of the key challenges in algorithmic
mechanism design. A great amount of work has focused on designing truthful mechanisms that
can be implemented efficiently, at a minimum loss of social efficiency, including, e.g., combinatorial
auctions [23, 14, 13, 16] and machine scheduling [4, 3, 12]. In other words, these works study the
question “What is the power or limit of computation to approximate a socially optimal solution at
a cost of being truthful?”.
Second, to enforce a strategic incentive environment, the VCG mechanisms may result in a huge
amount of overpayment to the participants [4]. In practice, however, we cannot expect a mechanism
to induce large expenses since the market designer may have his own objectives as well (e.g., revenue
maximization). A number of works have therefore focused on designing (computationally efficient)
truthful mechanisms that are frugal (i.e., with a small payment) [4, 29, 20, 8, 21], or with a sharp
budget constraint [28, 9], or even further, that do not have any payment [11, 25, 22, 5, 15, 2].
There are a number of important domains, e.g., political elections, organ donations, and school
admissions, where monetary transfers are strictly prohibited. That is, money cannot be treated as a
medium of compensation [24]. This traces back to the well-studied social choice theory which maps
agents preferences to a set of alternatives. The mechanism design in these settings (a.k.a., social
choice function) requires no payment and therefore is more challenging. Specifically, in contrast
with the VCG mechanisms, a socially optimal solution no longer suffices for truthfulness. Hence,
a sacrifice in social welfare is a necessity to derive a truthful bidding environment. This raises the
following question:
What is the power or limit of compensation to approximate a socially optimal solution
at a cost of being truthful?
We will address the question in the present paper focusing on “How (is the design)?” and “How
good (is the approximation)?”.
Recently, Procaccia and Tennenholtz [25] originated the study of approximate mechanism design
without money, which considers mechanism design questions to achieve truthfulness without using
money while providing good approximations to socially optimal solutions. They (and follow up
work [22, 1]) considered a facility location problem where agents report their locations in a metric
space and a mechanism chooses some places in the space to install facilities that serve all agents;
every agent would like to minimize the distance from his own location to the closest facility. Moti-
vated by kidney exchange, Ashlagi et al. [5] considered a matching problem where hospitals report
individual vertices and a compatible pairing is then established; the objective of every hospital is
to have as many of their own matched individuals as possible. Dughmi and Ghosh [15] considered
a job scheduling problem in the framework of generalized assignment problem (e.g., [27, 17]) where
every job has a preference over machines and reports which machines it is compatible with, and
then based on the reported information a mechanism outputs a feasible assignment from jobs to
machines.
Notice that the bidding languages in the above examples are all about the combinatorial struc-
ture of the problems. For instance, in the kidney exchange model [5], hospitals report the mem-
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bership of vertices to form an underlying graph; in the job scheduling problem [15], jobs report
compatible edges to form an underlying assignment bipartite graph. Such restrictions on the bid-
ding languages to some extent are necessary in the sense that we have to escape impossibility results
of social choice such as the well-known Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [24]. In particular, as mon-
etary transfers are not allowed, one cannot expect any interesting results if bidding languages are
about valuations, even for the simplest single item setting. The work of [25, 22, 5, 15, 2], on the
other hand, provides truthful mechanisms with good approximations and demonstrates the power
of approximate mechanism design without using money.
1.1 Our Contributions
We follow the stream of approximate mechanism design without money and propose a natural
framework, called the generalized packing problem (gpp): There is a ground set of items whose
values are public (e.g., it is common knowledge how much they can be sold for in a marketplace),
and every agent holds a subset of items (e.g., the items that the agent is able to produce). The
objective is to pick items from all agents so as to maximize the total valuation of selected items
given a public known feasibility constraint; this enforces which set of items can be feasibly chosen.
The gpp possesses a rich structure and models a variety of practical settings like resource allo-
cation, job scheduling, and procurement auctions, etc. It includes a number of well-studied models
as special cases in terms of the feasibility constraint, e.g., matroid, knapsack, graph matching (the
ground set corresponds to edges), graph independent set (the ground set corresponds to vertices),
interval job scheduling, and the generalized assignment problem (the ground set corresponds to
job-machine pairs). These problems have a common feature characterized by the gpp: there are
limited resources to satisfy the demands of all of the competitive individuals.
The flexibility of the feasibility constraint enables us to further set restrictions on the number
of items that can be picked from each agent. We will consider the following two standard settings
in the paper: unit demand (unit) where at most one item can be selected from each agent, and
multi-unit demand (mul) where there is no restriction on the number of items that can be picked
from an agent (as long as the aggregate solution remains feasible). We note that the former is
equivalent to saying that on top of the feasibility constraint of the latter, there is an additional
partition matroid constraint among all agents, which restricts each one to be unit demand.
While the market designer cares about overall social welfare and would like to search for an
optimum (indeed, some instances, like knapsack, job scheduling, and generalized assignment prob-
lem, are NP-hard to solve), every agent, on the other hand, is only concerned with his own benefit,
which is measured by the total valuation of his own items selected (e.g., how much his items can
be sold in the marketplace). Given a mechanism setup by the market designer, every agent reports
a subset of items (i.e., the claim from the agent of which items that he is able to produce), and the
mechanism then picks item(s) from the claimed subset of each agent so that the aggregate selected
items form a feasible solution.
Counter-intuitively, an agent may report a smaller subset to obtain a better outcome for some
badly designed protocols (see more discussions in Section 3). Our objective is therefore to design
truthful mechanisms without money that can be implemented in polynomial time and yield good
approximations to the optimal solution with full information. We show different approximation
results for different instances, summarized in the table on the next page.
The work closest to ours is by Dughmi and Ghosh [15] who considered the same model for gap
and its variants, where every agent owns a job and knows the corresponding compatible job-machine
pairs (those pairs correspond to items in the language of gpp). The authors gave a logarithmic ap-
proximation truthful in expectation mechanism, and left as an open question whether there exists
a constant approximation truthful mechanism. We solve the problem with an affirmative answer.
Indeed, our mechanism is universally truthful (i.e., distributed over deterministic truthful mecha-
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Unit demand (unit) Multi-unit demand (mul)
Matroid 2 approx∗ optimal∗
Matching 3 approx∗ logarithmic approx§
Knapsack (knapsack) constant approx† constant approx§
Gneralized assignment problem (gap) constant approx† (main result) —
∗Deterministic mechanisms.
†Universally truthful randomized mechanisms.
§Truthful in expectation randomized mechanisms.
nisms), which is stronger than truthful in expectation (i.e., truthful bidding maximizes expected
utility).
We note that the matching model considered in our paper is different from the previous work [5],
where agents hold vertices rather than edges. Further, our model is a generalization of the matching
problem considered in [15]: In their setting every agent holds all the edges incident to a vertex that
is on one side of a bipartite graph, whereas in our setting the underlying graph is not necessarily
bipartite and every agent can keep an arbitrary set of edges. Similarly, the knapsack model consid-
ered in our paper allows every agent to keep multiple items, whereas in [15] every agent only holds
one item.
All the models considered in the present paper, i.e., matroid, matching, knapsack, and gap,
have different aspects, and one cannot be considered as a special case of another. Further, our
results imply that unit demand and multi-unit demand settings are two rather different models.
For instance, solving the multi-unit demand case (e.g., optimally for matroid-mul) does not
imply the same solution for unit demand. Indeed, we can show that no deterministic truthful
mechanism can beat the approximation ratio 2 for matroid-unit. On the other hand, a simple
greedy algorithm yields a truthful mechanism for matching-unit with an approximation ratio of
3, but it is not truthful for matching-mul. A similar difference can be seen between knapsack-
unit and knapsack-mul. Our work therefore broadens the scope of approximate mechanism
design without money to a larger domain with more positive results.
1.2 Techniques
As discussed above, designing truthful mechanisms without money has an extra constraint and,
thus, adds additional difficulties. Further, the models in our framework gpp are multi-parameter
problems, where each agent holds several items; in the multi-unit demand model, an agent can
even win multiple items which can be interconnected through the combinatorial structure of the
problem. Some powerful characterizations, e.g., the monotonicity condition [4], no longer suffice for
truthfulness. For matroid and matching, due to their desirable combinatorial properties, a simple
greedy algorithm still solves the problems nearly optimally (except matching-mul). For knapsack
and gap, however, the greedy can perform arbitrarily badly and will not suffice; new ideas therefore
have to be explored.
Our main technical contribution is the application of approaches from the stable matching
theory to design truthful mechanisms. Stable matching, introduced by Gale and Shapley in their
seminal work [18], is a fundamental solution concept in the context of matching marketplaces and
has an enormous influence on the design of real world matching protocols. In the setup, there
are a set of men and a set of women, each with a preference ranking over members of the other
side; a matching between the men and women is stable if there is no man-woman pair who both
strictly prefer each other to their current partners. From the strategic point of view, while Roth’s
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impossibility result (Theorem 4.4, [26]) implies that it does not admit any truthful design for both
men and women to claim their preferences truthfully, the men-optimal stable matching algorithm
(i.e., men make proposals in the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley) is indeed
truthful for all men. The same incentive result holds if the matching is many-to-one (i.e., one
side of the market can have multiple assignments) where the matches are proposed from the unit
demand side of the market (Theorem 5.16, [26]).
In order to apply the stable matching theory to mechanism design, we need to define preferences
for the two parties, i.e., jobs and machines in gap. In particular, since every machine with a
knapsack constraint can take multiple jobs, one has to also specify a preference of the machine
over subsets of jobs, not only over individual jobs. Given carefully designed preferences of jobs
and machines, we run a deferred acceptance stable matching algorithm (jobs make proposals) to
generate a feasible assignment, which is shown to be truthful for a number of special cases. For
the general case of gap, unfortunately and surprisingly (compared to the incentive result described
above for many-to-one matchings), the stable matching algorithm may not guarantee truthfulness.
To derive a truthful mechanism with a constant approximation for the general gap, we build
our mechanism on the stable matching algorithm as a critical component and use the idea of
random sampling: We choose, in expectation, half of the jobs to form a test set T and run the
stable matching algorithm on T . The returned stable assignment AT gives a close estimate to the
structure of the optimal solution with a high probability. We then, using the sampled outcome
AT as a guidance, compute a real assignment A for the rest of the jobs by considering them one
by one in a predescribed order. Stable matching also plays a crucial role in the analysis of the
mechanism. In particular, for every unassigned job-machine pair in a stable assignment, since at
least one of them prefers its current assignment, the contribution of either the job or the machine
will compensate the loss of the pair. Based on this idea, we establish an upper bound on the optimal
solution using a stable assignment A∗ returned by the stable matching algorithm running on all
jobs. By using a number of desirable properties from stable matchings and probabilistic analysis,
we compare the stable assignments A, AT , and A∗, and show that they are all close to each other,
which yields the desired constant approximation.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the high level structure of our mechanism, i.e., random
sampling plus online algorithm fashion, has a similar flavor to the online mechanisms for secretary
problems [7, 6]. However, in the random samplings of those works, the decision for every sampled
object is binary, i.e., either pick it or not; in our setting, deciding an assignment for sampled
jobs is still a complicated combinatorial problem. In addition, in the secretary problem objects
are assumed to arrive online, whereas ours is a pure offline problem and we take advantage of
considering jobs in a fixed order to ensure truthfulness. This general framework of designing truthful
mechanisms (without money) by random sampling plus online mechanisms may find applications
in other problems.
2 Preliminaries
We consider the following generalized packing problem (gpp): There is a ground set of items A =
{a1, . . . , am}, where each item aj ∈ A has a public known valuation vj . In addition, there are
n agents where each agent i holds a disjoint subset of items Ai ⊆ A. The membership of items
in Ai is private information and only known to agent i. Our objective is to select subsets of
items Si ⊆ Ai from all agents with maximum possible total valuation
∑
i
∑
aj∈Si vj given a public
known feasibility constraint, which enforces which sets of items can be feasibly chosen. The gpp
problem includes a number of natural problems as special cases with respect to different feasibility
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constraints. We will consider the following ones in the paper:
• Matroid. The set A forms a base set of a matroid and the feasible sets are all independent
sets of the matroid.
• Matching. Given an underlying graph, the set A corresponds to the set of edges of the graph,
and the selected edges have to be a matching in the graph.
• Knapsack. Each item aj ∈ A has another parameter capacity cj , and the total capacity of all
selected items should be bounded by the knapsack capacity C.
• Generalized assignment problem (gap). There are a number of machines (or bins) and jobs
(or goods), where each machine has a capacity and each job has a value and capacity for each
of its compatible machines. The ground set A therefore corresponds to the set of compatible
job-machine pairs.
As discussed in the Introduction, the problem can be considered in the cases where one can pick
either at most one item (unit) or multiple items (mul) from each agent. We will use problem-unit
and problem-mul to denote the two models for the given problem respectively (e.g., matroid-
unit and matroid-mul respectively refer to matroid with unit demand and multi-unit demand).
Agents, as self-interested individuals, have their own objectives as well and would like to max-
imize the total valuation of their own item(s) selected. It is therefore not always the case that an
agent reports his true information Ai to the protocol to his best interest. Algorithmic mechanism
design takes such incentive issues into account with a focus on managing self-interested behaviors
of the agents. In our framework, upon receiving a submitted bid Bi from each agent, which can be
any subset of Ai,
1 the mechanism chooses a subset Si ⊆ Bi from each agent as an output so that the
collection of all Si’s satisfies the feasibility constraint. The total valuation of the mechanism output
(i.e., social welfare) is
∑
i
∑
aj∈Si vj , and the utility of each agent i is defined to be
∑
aj∈Si vj .
For a given protocol, all agents would like to bid strategically to maximize their own utility. We
say a mechanism is truthful if it is a dominant strategy for every agent to report his true information
Ai. That is, for any submitted bids of other agents, no individual can get a better outcome by
reporting a set that is different from his true information. If a mechanism is not deterministic,
we say the mechanism is universally truthful if it takes a random distribution over deterministic
truthful mechanisms, and is truthful in expectation if no risk-neutral agent can obtain more utility
in expectation by misreporting his private information.
Note that the mechanisms considered in the current paper only pick item(s) from each agent
as an output, without compensating with a payment. This is the reason why the classic VCG
mechanism is not applicable even for polynomial time solvable problems like matroid and matching.
At the cost of being truthful and without payment, we cannot expect the mechanism to work as
well as VCG and have an output that maximizes social welfare. Our focus therefore is to design
truthful mechanisms (without money) that can be implemented in polynomial time and yield good
approximations to the optimal social welfare given that all agents report their true information.
3 Warmup: Matroid and Matching
We first consider two “simple” polynomial time solvable problems matroid and matching, as a
warmup, to illustrate the framework of gpp and approximate mechanism design without money.
1Since the mechanism selects items from the agents, it is quite risky if an agent reports an item that he is not
able to produce (i.e., not in Ai). In particular, what if one such non-existing item is chosen? One possibility is to
introduce a penalty (e.g., utility −1) for the agent who cannot provide the item that he claims. All mechanisms
considered in the present paper for the unit demand models continue to work for this variant.
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Consider the following simple greedy algorithm: Pick items according to their decreasing order
of values v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vm while preserving feasibility. That is, if S is the current selected
subset of items from {a1, . . . , aj−1}, then the algorithm includes item aj if S ∪ {aj} is feasible.
Not surprisingly, the greedy algorithm yields an optimal truthful mechanism for the matroid-mul
problem, and a 2 approximation truthful mechanism for the matroid-unit problem.
For the matching-unit problem, the greedy algorithm again picks edges according to the
decreasing order of their values; once an edge is selected, all edges incident to its two endpoints
or possessed by the same agent will be removed as they cannot be selected any more. Since one
can pick at most one edge from each agent, the problem corresponds to the intersection of three
partition matroids: one for left-hand side nodes, one for right-hand side nodes, and one for all
agents. The greedy algorithm, therefore, gives a 3 approximation truthful mechanism.
For the matching-mul problem where multiple edges can be chosen from an agent, unfortu-
nately, the greedy algorithm does not ensure truthfulness. We further note that another natural
strategy, the maximum matching algorithm, while yielding an optimal solution, also cannot guar-
antee truthfulness for matching-mul, even for matching-unit. See examples in Appendix A.3
for the arguments. In Appendix A.4, we give an O(log(m)) approximation truthful in expectation
mechanism for the matching-mul problem.
On the other hand, for matroid-unit, matching-unit and matching-mul, there is a lower
bound of 2 on the approximation ratio of any deterministic mechanism. The detailed arguments of
this section can be found in Appendix A.
4 Knapsack
Next we consider the knapsack problem where each item j has a value vj and a capacity cj , and
there is a knapsack constraint C which restricts the subsets of items that can be feasibly chosen.
In our model, every agent holds a subset of items (this is why knapsack cannot be considered as
a special case of gap); depending on the demand, either at most one item (unit) or multiple items
(mul) can be picked from an agent.
While the greedy algorithm — pick items according to the ratio
vj
cj
— can do arbitrarily bad, it is
well-known that a variant by complementing the greedy with a single item of the largest value gives
a 2 approximation to knapsack. Can we convert this greedy algorithm to a truthful mechanism in a
similar way as what we did for matroid and matching? In matroid and matching, the greedy
algorithm processes the items in the order by their values, which is consistent with the preferences
of the agents. For knapsack, however, the greedy algorithm considers the items in the order of
the ratio
vj
cj
, while the preferences of the agents are still according to the value vj . As a result, the
greedy algorithm is not truthful.
To derive a truthful mechanism with a good approximation for knapsack-unit, we use the
idea of random sampling: We choose in expectation half of the agents and compute a solution
by the greedy algorithm; we then use it as a guidance to compute a real output by considering
the remaining agents one by one. For knapsack-mul, there are additional difficulties when we
consider each remaining agent: the optimal solution is NP-hard to compute and an algorithm with
a good approximation may not guarantee truthfulness. To get around the issue, we output a subset
whose expected total value is equal to that given by the fractional optimal solution (which can
be computed easily by the greedy algorithm); this gives truthful in expectation for the considered
agent. All details are referred to Appendix B.
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5 Generalized Assignment Problem
In this section, we will consider the generalized assignment problem (gap) where we are given a set
of jobs and a set of machines. Throughout this section, we will denote jobs by i and machines by k.
For each job i and machine k, there is a value vi,k and a capacity ci,k. Further, each machine k has
a capacity constraint Ck. An output of the gap is an assignment between the jobs and machines
where each job is assigned to at most one machine and the aggregate capacity of the assigned jobs
on each machine is within its capacity constraint.
Given a feasible assignment A between the jobs and machines, let Ai be the machine that job i
is assigned to (denote Ai = ∅ if i is not assigned to any machine), and Ak = {i | Ai = k} be the set
of jobs that are assigned to machine k. Further, to simplify the notations, let v(A) = ∑(i,k)∈A vik
be the total value of the assignment, v(Ai) = vi,Ai be the value of the assignment to job i (denote
v(∅) = 0), and v(S) = ∑i∈S v(Ai) for any subset of jobs S. Finally, let v(Ak) = ∑i∈Ak vi,k be the
total value of the jobs assigned to machine k. The definitions c(·) are defined similarly with respect
to capacity.
We follow the strategic consideration studied in [15] where each job i is held by an agent, and the
private information that the agent holds is the compatible pairs (i, k) for the machines. Following
our gpp language described above, we have a bipartite graph G where one side corresponds to
agents/jobs and the other side corresponds to machines, and the edges represent the compatible
job-machine pairs. Every edge (i, k) ∈ G corresponds to an “item” whose value vik and capacity cik
are public. The private information that every agent/job i has is the membership of its compatible
edge {(i, k) ∈ G | i}. All job-machine pairs discussed in this section are with respect to the
underlying compatible graph G.
For a given mechanism, every job reports a subset of compatible pairs and would like to get
assigned to a machine k with maximum possible value vik. Our objective again is to design a
truthful mechanism to approximate the optimal gap solution. Dughmi and Ghosh [15] gave a
logarithmic approximation truthful in expectation mechanism for the problem. In this section, we
will show a constant approximation universally truthful mechanism. Our mechanism is based on
stable matching and random sampling. We will first discuss a stable matching algorithm, and then
in Section 5.2 describe the main mechanism.
5.1 Stable Matching Algorithm
Stable matching is a fundamental solution concept in the context of two-sided matching mar-
ketplaces, introduced by Gale and Shapley in their seminal work [18]. A matching between the
two parties of a bipartite marketplace is called stable if there is no pair who both strictly prefer
each other to their current partners. The deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley [18]
computes a stable matching.
In order to apply the stable matching theory to our problem gap, one needs to define preferences
for the two parties, jobs and machines. For every job i, its preference over machines is pretty
straightforward, which is simply according to the preference of the agent, i.e., ranking machines by
the value vik. For every machine k, we may define its preference over jobs in a similar way according
to the values. For such preferences, the deferred acceptance algorithm can be implemented in the
same way as the greedy algorithm (i.e., the order of proposals is according to the value vik and
a machine accepts a proposal as long as it has enough remaining capacity). We denote such
implementation by sm-greedy. By the fact that every job goes to at most one machine, it can be
seen that sm-greedy is truthful for all jobs for any fixed tie breaking rule.
The solution generated by sm-greedy, however, may have an arbitrarily bad total valuation,
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since the preferences completely ignore the capacities of the jobs. To balance the value vik and
capacity cik, we will consider the following preferences in this section:
• Every job i has a strict preference list, denoted by Li, which is according to the decreasing
order of vik.
• For every machine k, its strict preference over individual jobs is according to the decreasing
order of the ratio vikcik . Since a machine may take multiple jobs, we have to specify the
preference of every machine k over subsets of jobs, which is defined as follows: For any two
subsets of jobs S and S′, where
∑
i∈S cik ≤ Ck and
∑
i∈S′ cik ≤ Ck, first remove all common
jobs and then all pairs of jobs in S and S′ that have the same ratios vikcik , then let k prefer the
one which has its most preferred individual job among all the remainings. Finally, k does not
prefer any subset whose aggregate capacity is beyond its capacity Ck. We denote such strict
preference list of every machine by Lk.2
Note that the preferences Li and Lk are strict. If there are the same values vik = vik′ or ratios
vik
cik
=
vi′k
ci′k
, we always break ties in favor of the smaller capacity; if the capacities are the same as
well, ties are broken in an arbitrary but fixed order. We say a feasible assignment A is stable if it
does not contain any blocking pair i and k, where i strictly prefers k to Ai and k can pick a strictly
better subset of jobs in the collection Ak ∪ {i} (which is easy to verify).
We consider the following deferred acceptance algorithm, called sm-da-alg.
sm-da-alg
• Initialize all jobs to be unassigned and set A = ∅.
• while there is an unassigned job which has not proposed to all machines in Li
1. Among all pairs (i, k) where i is unassigned and k is his highest ranked
unproposed machine, pick one with the maximum vikcik and let i propose to k.
2. Let S = ∅.
3. For each job i′ ∈ Ak ∪ {i} in the order according to the preference Lk
– if S ∪ {i′} is feasible for k, let S ← S ∪ {i′}.
4. If i ∈ S, set Ak ∪ {i} \ S to be unassigned and update assignment Ak ← S.
5. Else (we must have S = Ak), set i to be unassigned.
• Output A.
When there are ties in the selection of the largest ratio, i.e., vikcik =
vi′k′
ci′k′
, to implement the
algorithm, we use the same tie-breaking rule as described above for Li and Lk. Given this tie-
breaking rule and the strict preferences of Li and Lk, the output of the algorithm is uniquely
determined. Since every job proposes to every machine at most once, the algorithm is guaranteed
to terminate. We further note that Step 1 of the sm-da-alg, picking a pair with the largest ratio,
is necessary to derive the following Theorem 5.1.
2Alternatively, one can define the preference over feasible subsets of jobs by simply comparing the aggregate
values of the jobs in the subsets. Such a preference rule, while capturing the real preference for social welfare, is
not implementable as for any given unfeasible set S, finding a feasible subset S′ ⊂ S that the machine prefers most
is equivalent to solving the knapsack problem, which is known to be NP-hard. Our preference Lk, however, still
balances the values and capacities in terms of their ratios, and is easy to implement in the following stable matching
algorithm and the main mechanism.
8
For the special cases job value invariant and job capacity invariant (defined below), Dughmi and
Ghosh [15] gave 4 approximation truthful in expectation mechanisms by an LP-based approach.
As we can see next, the combination of the stable matching algorithm and greedy algorithm gives
a universally truthful mechanism of the same ratio for these cases, as well two other special cases.
Theorem 5.1. Consider the following mechanism: Run either sm-greedy or sm-da-alg with
equal probability. The mechanism is universally truthful with an approximation ratio of 4 for each
of the following cases:
1. (Job value invariant) vik = vik′ for all machines k, k
′ and any job i.
2. (Job capacity invariant) cik = cik′ for all machines k, k
′ and any job i.
3. (Machine value invariant) vik = vi′k for all jobs i, i
′ and any machine k.
4. (Machine capacity invariant) cik = ci′k for all jobs i, i
′ and any machine k.
While the sm-da-alg solves the problem nicely for the special cases, unfortunately (and sur-
prisingly), it is not necessarily truthful in general; we show an example in Appendix C.2.
5.2 Main Mechanism
In this section we will use sm-da-alg as a critical component to describe a universally truthful
mechanism for the general gap problem. We first give three truthful mechanisms, then the main
mechanism takes a uniform distribution on these mechanisms. Throughout this section, λ > 2 is an
integer and µ > 0 is a constant which are both fed as parameters to the mechanisms; their values
can be taken appropriately with some conditions described at the end of the analysis.
We first present two simple deterministic mechanisms, which try to assign those pairs with large
values. The first one is designated to deal with the pairs which have “large” capacities with respect
to the capacity of the corresponding machine.
gap-mechanism-1(λ)
• Remove all pairs (i, k) with capacity cik < 1λCk.
• For the remaining pairs, output an assignment by the sm-greedy algorithm
with the restriction that each machine can take at most one job.
The following procedure divides the capacity of each machine evenly into λ slots and assigns at
most one job to each slot.
gap-mechanism-2(λ)
• Remove all pairs (i, k) with capacity cik > 1λCk.
• For the remaining pairs, output an assignment by the sm-greedy algorithm
with the restriction that each machine can take at most λ jobs.
Next we will describe the key mechanism, which will apply the stable matching algorithm sm-
da-alg as a critical component. In fact, we will use a slightly different version of sm-da-alg: For
every machine k and a given number C ′k < Ck, we define as follows a virtual capacity constraint C
′
k
which provides an additional restriction on the feasible set: Given a feasible assignment i1, i2, . . . , i`
on machine k with preferences i1  i2  · · ·  i` on Lk, we require
∑`−1
j=1 cijk ≤ C ′k (note that it is
allowed that
∑`
j=1 cijk > C
′
k). That is, while the total capacity of the assigned job on machine k
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can be larger than C ′k, the removal of the least preferred one must ensure that the total capacity
becomes within the virtual capacity. Running sm-da-alg with virtual capacity C ′k means that in
the process of the algorithm, the assigned jobs on machine k always satisfy the virtual capacity
constraint.
gap-mechanism-3(λ, µ)
1. Remove all pairs (i, k) with capacity cik >
1
λCk.
2. Select each job independently at random with probability 12 into group T.
• For each job i ∈ T, let Li be his preference list over machines.
• For each machine k, let Lk be its preference list over jobs in T.
• Run the sm-da-alg with virtual capacity λ−1λ Ck for each machine k.
• Denote the generated assignment by AT .
3. For each machine k, define the threshold value tk = µ · v(A
T
k )
Ck
.
4. Let R be the remaining jobs that are not selected in T, and set A = ∅.
5. For each job i ∈ R in a given fixed order
• Let k = arg maxk
{
vi,k | cik + c(Ak) ≤ Ck and vikcik ≥ tk
}
.
• If k defined above exists, let Ai = k; otherwise, let Ai = ∅.
6. Output A.
In the mechanism, we first sample, in expectation, half of the jobs in T , then on this set T run
the stable matching algorithm sm-da-alg. The assignment AT from T gives a good estimate to
the structure of the optimal solution with a high probability. We therefore use the average
v(ATk )
Ck
,
multiplied by a given constant µ, as a threshold tk for the jobs that can be assigned to machine
k. That is, for the remaining jobs, we explicitly remove those pairs (i, k) with a ratio less than
the threshold, i.e., vikcik < tk. The mechanism then performs in an online and greedy way, trying
to have the best possible assignment for each considered job, given the capacity constraints on the
machines.
Claim 5.1. gap-mechanism-1(λ) and gap-mechanism-2(λ) are deterministic truthful mecha-
nisms, and gap-mechanism-3(λ, µ) is a universally truthful mechanism.
Claim 5.2. The assignment AT returned by the mechanism gap-mechanism-3(λ, µ) is stable with
respect to all jobs in T and all machines with virtual capacity λ−1λ Ck.
We note that the stability result established in the above claim is only with respect to the
virtual capacity constraint; without which the sm-da-alg may not compute a stable assignment.
Stability is helpful in the approximation analysis of the following main mechanism.
Theorem 5.2. Consider the following mechanism gap-mechanism-main: Run one of the fol-
lowing three mechanisms gap-mechanism-1(λ), gap-mechanism-2(λ), gap-mechanism-3(λ, µ)
with uniform probability. Then gap-mechanism-main is a universally truthful mechanism with a
constant approximation ratio for the gap problem.
Since all three mechanisms are (universally) truthful, gap-mechanism-main is a universally
truthful mechanism as well. The constant approximation analysis is given in Appendix C.4.
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6 Concluding Remarks
The focus of the present paper is on approximate mechanism design without money. We propose
a general framework, the generalized packing problem (gpp), and give constant approximation
truthful mechanisms for a few special cases of gpp. Due to space limit, a number of interesting
claims and proofs are deferred to appendix. As our focus is on exploring domains in which there
exist nearly optimal truthful mechanisms, we do not elaborate on optimizing the approximation
ratios. Closing the gap between upper and lower bounds certainly deserves further study. Another
interesting direction of future work is to further explore other special cases of gpp (e.g., interval
job scheduling) in the framework of approximate mechanism design without money.
In our model gpp, we assume that the subsets of items that all agents hold are disjoint. For
matroid, matching, and knapsack, this assumption can be easily removed and all our results
still hold. In particular, if both agents are able to produce the same item, in the output we explicitly
specify which agent contributes the item. Further, it is even possible that both agents contribute
the item simultaneously (it means the item will have multiple copies in the output), as long as it
does not violate the feasibility constraint.
Our approaches include greedy algorithms (for all problems), random sampling plus online
mechanisms (for knapsack and gap), as well as stable matching (for gap). The fairness condition
captured by stable matching helps to manage self-interested behaviors of the participating agents
in one side of a market and to bound efficiency loss for unmatched pairs. We believe the idea of
stable matching may find applications in other mechanism design (without money) problems.
In the solution to gap, we introduce a new stable matching model where one side of the market
has a knapsack constraint, generalizing the original many-to-one matching market model. For the
new model, the deferred acceptance algorithm, sm-da-alg, may not compute a stable assignment
in general, even if all preferences are strict. This is a significant difference between the knapsack
constrained stable matching model and the original models where the deferred acceptance algorithm
always computes a stable outcome. It is interesting future work to explore different aspects of
stable matchings in the new model, say, existence, computation, solution structure, and economic
properties (e.g., incentives).
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A Matroid and Matching
A.1 Greedy Algorithm for Matroid
Proposition A.1. The greedy algorithm yields an optimal truthful mechanism for the matroid-
mul problem, and a 2 approximation truthful mechanism for the matroid-unit problem.
Proof. For the matroid-mul problem, it is well-known that the greedy algorithm computes an
optimal independent set. To prove the truthfulness, for any fixed bids of other agents, we consider
the bidding behavior of an agent i. Assume the order of the items handled by the greedy algorithm
is given by v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn. Let us denote by T the truthful bids of all agents and by T ′ the
bids, where agent i has reported a proper subset Bi ⊂ Ai instead of Ai and the rest have reported
truthfully. We consider the running process of the greedy algorithm on the bids T and T ′; we
denote by Tj and T
′
j , respectively, the subsets of items that the algorithm selects when passing the
item aj . For that we observe the following.
• For any j, |Tj | ≥ |T ′j |. Assume otherwise and consider the smallest j with |Tj | < |T ′j |. Since
Bi is a subset of Ai, all items in T
′
j are available to the algorithm run for the bids T . There
is an item aj′ ∈ T ′j \Tj such that Tj ∪{aj′} is an independent set by definition of the matroid
and since |Tj | < |T ′j | (in case of multiple items, we pick the item with the smallest index).
This implies that Tj′ ∪ {aj′} should be an independent set as well, since Tj′ ⊆ Tj . Hence, the
greedy algorithm should add item aj′ to Tj′ , a contradiction.
• For any item aj ∈ Tj \ T ′j , it must hold true that aj ∈ Ai \ Bi and agent i wins item aj
when bidding Ai. Assume otherwise and consider the smallest j, such that aj ∈ Tj \ T ′j , and
either aj /∈ Ai \ Bi or another agent wins item aj for the bids T . For either case, item aj
is also available to the algorithm for bids T ′ (however, the algorithm cannot pick the item,
as the set it would obtain would not be an independent set). Thus we have T ′j−1 = T
′
j and
Tj = Ti−1 ∪{aj}. Let δ = |Tj−1| − |T ′j−1| ≥ 0, then we have δ+ 1 = |Tj | − |T ′j |. Hence, by the
definition of a matroid one can find δ + 1 items in Tj \ T ′j , denoted by X, such that T ′j ∪X
is an independent set. Further, aj /∈ X, because otherwise, the algorithm would add aj into
T ′j . Then by the choice of j, we have X ⊆ Ai \Bi. Now observe that
|T ′j−1 ∪X| = |T ′j−1|+ δ + 1 = |Tj−1|+ 1
Hence, there is an item aj′ ∈ T ′j−1 ∪ X \ Tj−1 such that j′ ≤ j − 1 and Tj−1 ∪ {aj′} is an
independent set. Therefore, any subset of Tj−1∪{aj′} is an independent set as well. Moreover,
we have aj′ ∈ T ′j−1 \ Tj−1, since X ⊆ Tj−1. Thus, when the algorithm reaches item aj′ , it
should be added into Tj′ ⊆ Tj−1, a contradiction.
Given by the above two observations and the greedy rule, we can see that the total value of the
items that i wins when bidding Ai is always at least that of when bidding Bi. This implies that it
is always to the best interest of every agent to report his true information.
For the matroid-unit problem, the truthfulness follows trivially from the facts that one can
pick at most one item from every agent; and that the greedy algorithm always picks the item with
the maximum possible value meanwhile keeping feasibility. The matroid-unit problem is a two
matroids intersection problem, where one matroid is the original one that defines the feasibility
constraint and the other one is given by the condition that one can pick at most one item from every
agent, which defines a partition matroid over all items. It is known that the greedy algorithm gives
a 2 approximation for the two-matroid intersection problem, which implies the desired ratio.
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A.2 Deterministic Lower Bound
Proposition A.2. No deterministic truthful mechanism can have an approximation ratio better
than 2 for matroid-unit, matching-unit, and matching-mul.
Proof. For the matching problem, consider the graph containing four edges with values v(t1, u1) =
v(t2, u1) = 1 +  and v(t1, u2) = v(t2, u2) = 1, where  > 0 is sufficiently small. There are two
agents, where the first agent i1 holds edges (t1, u1) and (t1, u2) and the second agent i2 holds
edges (t2, u1) and (t2, u2). The optimal solution either picks {(t1, u1), (t2, u2)} or {(t1, u2), (t2, u1)}
with a total value of 2 + . If there is a deterministic truthful mechanism with an approximation
ratio better than 2− , then it has to choose one of the optimal solutions; assume without loss of
generality that it outputs (t1, u1) and (t2, u2). If i2 hides the edge (t2, u2), the mechanism still needs
to guarantee the 2 −  approximation for the new instance; hence, {(t1, u2), (t2, u1)} will be the
output. The utility of i2 has therefore increased from 1 to 1 + , which implies that the mechanism
is not truthful.
For the matroid-unit problem, consider a partition matroid with ground set {a1, a2, a3, a4}.
An independent set can take at most one item from {a1, a2} and at most one item from {a3, a4}.
The values of the items are v1 = v2 = 1 +  and v3 = v4 = 1. There are two agents, where the first
agent holds {a1, a3} and the second agent holds {a2, a4}. The rest of the analysis is then the same
as the above argument.
We note that the above constructions can be easily generalized to knapsack-unit, knapsack-
mul, and gap, with the same lower bound.
A.3 Examples for matching
We claim that the greedy algorithm is not truthful for matching-mul. Consider the example of
the following Figure (B), where agent i holds three edges (t1, u1), (t3, u4), (t4, u3), and all other
edges are held by separate agents. If all agents report their edges truthfully, the greedy algorithm
will output {(t1, u1), (t2, u3), (t3, u2)}, which gives utility 10 to agent i. However, if i hides the edge
(t1, u1), then {(t1, u2), (t2, u1), (t3, u4), (t4, u3)} will be generated by the greedy algorithm, which
gives utility 12 to agent i.
t1 t2
u1 u2
10
20
175
190
(A) The max matching algorithm is not truthful
for andMATCHING-UNIT MATCHING-MUL
10
9 9 88 6 6
t1 t2 t3 t4
u1 u2 u3 u4
(B) The greedy algorithm is not truthful for MATCHING-MUL
In addition, another natural strategy, the maximum matching algorithm, while yielding an
optimal solution, also cannot guarantee truthfulness for matching-mul, even for matching-unit.
Consider the example in the above Figure (A), where agent i holds two edges (t1, u1) and (t2, u1).
If he bids truthfully, his utility will be 10 from edge (t1, u1); if he hides the edge, then (t2, u1) will
be matched and his utility will be 20.
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A.4 Mechanism for matching-mul
In this section, we will present a simpleO(log(m)) approximation truthful in expectation mechanism
for the matching-mul problem. (Recall that m is the number of different items.)
matching-alg: Given submitted bids, let G = (V,E) be the resulting graph
• Let vmax = maxe∈E ve and V be the integer s.t. 2V−1 < vmax ≤ 2V .
• For any given fixed order of agents i1, . . . , in, let i∗ be the first one who claims
an edge of value vmax.
• Partition all edges according to their values into log(m) groups:(
2V−log(m)−1, 2V−log(m)
]
, . . . ,
(
2V−2, 2V−1
]
,
(
2V−1, 2V
]
(ignore those edges with values less than 2V−log(m)−1 < vmax/m).
• Pick a group uniformly at random and consider only the edges in the picked group.
• Initially, let S = ∅, and for each agent i in the order i∗, i1, . . . , in
– Let Si be a maximum matching restricted to the bid edges of agent i and the
set of unmatched vertices by S.
– Let Si be the set of edges that agent i wins.
– Let S ← S ∪ Si.
• Output S.
Proposition A.3. The above matching-alg gives an O(log(m))-approximation for the matching-
mul problem and is truthful in expectation.
Proof. We first analyze the performance of the algorithm. Note that the algorithm returns a
maximal matching (that is one cannot add any extra edge to it) for the chosen group. Since the
values of all edges in each group differ by a factor of at most 2, the algorithm yields a solution
that is within a constant factor to the maximum matching (a matching of the maximal possible
weight) of the selected group. For all the edges with values less than vmax/m, their summation
is at most vmax, which is at most the optimal solution of the edges in the group [vmax/2, vmax].
Since the algorithm uniformly chooses a group at random and there are log(m) groups in total, the
algorithm yields an O(log(m))-approximation solution to the optimal.
Next we analyze bidding strategies for all agents. The bid of any agent i, which does not have
an edge of value vmax, does not affect the way we partition edges into m groups. For any selected
group, the algorithm runs a greedy strategy for each individual agent in a given fixed order. Hence,
it is a dominant strategy for the agent to report his true information. The same argument extends
to the case when there are at least two agents who claim edges of the maximum value vmax. It
remains to consider the case when i∗ is the only agent who claims an edge of the maximum value
vmax. May i
∗ obtain a better outcome by hiding the edge? Assume that i∗ reports another set of
edges and v′max is the new maximum value for the new instance where 2V
′−1 < v′max ≤ 2V
′
for some
V ′, then the new partition of the groups will be(
2V
′−log(m)−1, 2V
′−log(m)
]
, . . . ,
(
2V
′−2, 2V
′−1
]
,
(
2V
′−1, 2V
′]
The algorithm will still pick one group uniformly at random and perform a greedy maximum
matching strategy for the selected group. While agent i∗ might be able to obtain more utility
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from the groups with smaller values (as they were not available in the instance with bid vmax), the
expected benefit is capped by 1log(m) · m · vmax/m = vmax/ log(m). On the other hand, agent i∗
loses the chance for the group
(
2V−1, 2V
]
where vmax stays in the new instance; since i
∗ has the
first priority among all agents, his utility from the group is at least vmax. Hence, i
∗ also loses an
expected utility of at least vmax/ log(m). For all other groups that are common in the two instances,
the utility that i∗ obtains in the instance with bid vmax is not smaller as he has the highest priority.
Therefore, i∗ cannot obtain a higher expected utility by bidding untruthfully.
B Knapsack
B.1 Mechanism for knapsack-unit
For knapsack-unit, we can pick at most one item from the agent i. We denote the aggregate
capacity of a set of items S by c(S) and the aggregate value by v(S). Let λ be a sufficiently
large integer, which will be fed as a parameter to our mechanisms. Its value will be determined
appropriately at the end of the analysis. The following is our sample mechanism.
ks-unit-sample(λ)
1. Delete all items with capacity cj >
C
λ .
2. Pick each agent independently at random with probability 12 into group T.
3. Let R be the remaining agents.
4. Run the greedy algorithm for T; let V be the total value of the solution.
5. Let S ← ∅.
6. For each agent i ∈ R in a fixed order
• Let X ← Ai
⋂{
j
∣∣ vj
cj
≥ V2C , c(S) + cj ≤ C
}
.
• If X 6= ∅, let j∗ = arg maxj∈X vj and S ← S ∪ {j∗}.
7. Output S.
We first prove a useful lemma, which shows that in the optimal solution not too many items
fail to pass the threshold V2C .
Claim B.1. Let OPT be the optimal solution for knapsack-unit problem. Then∑
j∈OPT
vj
cj
≥ v(OPT )
2C
vj ≥ 1
2
v(OPT ).
Proof. Assume otherwise, then we have
v(OPT ) =
∑
j∈OPT
vj =
∑
j∈OPT
vj
cj
≥ v(OPT )
2C
vj +
∑
j∈OPT
vj
cj
<
v(OPT )
2C
vj
<
1
2
v(OPT ) +
v(OPT )
2C
·
∑
j∈OPT
vj
cj
<
v(OPT )
2C
ci
≤ 1
2
v(OPT ) +
1
2
v(OPT ) = v(OPT ),
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a contradiction.
Note that the value V computed in the mechanism is at most v(OPT ). Therefore,∑
j∈OPT
vj
cj
≥ V
2C
vj ≥
∑
j∈OPT
vj
cj
≥ v(OPT )
2C
vj ≥ 1
2
v(OPT ).
The following is our mechanism for knapsack-unit.
ks-unit-mechanism
1. With probability 12, output an item with the largest value.
2. With probability 12, run ks-unit-sample(λ).
Theorem B.1. ks-unit-mechanism is universally truthful and has a constant approximation
ratio.
Proof. The truthfulness for the first part where we select a single item with the largest value is
straightforward. For ks-unit-sample(λ), agents in T do not have incentive to lie as none of their
items can be selected. For each agent i ∈ R, since we try to select the best possible item from
him given the capacity and threshold constraints, i does not have an incentive to lie. Thus, both
ks-unit-sample(λ) and ks-unit-mechanism are universally truthful.
Next we analyze the approximation ratio of ks-unit-mechanism. Assume without loss of
generality that the optimal value is 1, since we can scale simultaneously all the values without
affecting the outcome. If there is an item j with value vj ≥ 12λ , then with probability 12 , we
will pick an item with the highest value, which is at least vj . This already implies a constant
approximation. Therefore, we assume that the value of each item is less than 12λ . Now if we delete
all items with size larger than Cλ , in the optimal solution we will delete at most λ items, whose
total value is at most 12 . Therefore, the total value of the remaining items will be at least
1
2 . Thus,
it suffices to prove that ks-unit-sample(λ) achieves a constant approximation with respect to the
optimal solution on the setting where we have already removed all items of large size. In conclusion,
we may restrict ourself to the case where each item has a small value vj <
1
2λ and small size cj ≤ Cλ .
Let
OPTs =
{
j
∣∣∣ j ∈ OPT, cj ≤ C
λ
}
and
OPT∗ =
{
j
∣∣∣ j ∈ OPTs, vj
cj
≥ v(OPT
s)
2C
}
.
By the above argument and Claim B.1, we know that v(OPTs) ≥ 12 and v(OPT∗) ≥ v(OPT
s)
2 ≥ 14 .
In the algorithm, we put each agent either in group T or R independently at random with
probability 12 . Note that every item in OPT
s belongs to a different agent. Since all items have a
small value, we can apply Lemma C.1 in Appendix C.4, which tells us that with a high probability,
T will get “roughly” half of the total value of OPTs and R will get “roughly” half of the value of
OPT∗. By choosing a sufficiently large λ (according to Lemma C.1, λ ≥ 2 · 36), with probability
at least 0.75, we get v(T ∩ OPTs) ≥ 13v(OPTs) ≥ 16 . Similarly, with probability at least 0.75, for
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sufficiently large λ (≥ 4 · 36) we get v(R ∩OPT∗) ≥ v(OPT∗)3 ≥ 112 . Thus with probability at least
0.5, we have
v(T ∩OPTs) ≥ v(OPT
s)
3
≥ 1
6
and v(R ∩OPT∗) ≥ v(OPT
∗)
3
≥ 1
12
.
If the last two inequalities both hold, then the value V in ks-unit-sample(λ) is at least 112 , as all
items have a small size and therefore the greedy algorithm provides an approximation ratio smaller
than 2.
There are two possibilities regarding the process of the mechanism.
• ks-unit-sample(λ) at some step has taken nothing from an agent i, but i has an item with
vj
cj
≥ V2C . In this case S should occupy at least (1− 1λ)C capacity of the knapsack, since the
size of the item is less than or equal to Cλ . Since all chosen items have
vj
cj
≥ V2C , the total
value of the mechanism is at least (1− 1λ)V2 ≥ 148 (given that λ ≥ 2).
• ks-unit-sample(λ) has taken an item from every agent that has at least one item with
vj
cj
≥ V2C . Note that every item in R ∩ OPT∗ satisfies this condition. So for each item in
R ∩ OPT∗, either this or another one but with larger value is chosen from the same agent.
Therefore, the total value of items chosen by the mechanism is at least v(R ∩OPT∗) ≥ 112 .
For both cases, the expected value of the mechanism is at least a constant, which provides a
constant approximation to the optimal value 1. This completes the proof.
B.2 Mechanism for knapsack-mul
In knapsack-mul, we may choose several items from an agent. The most natural idea one may
consider here is to extend the mechanism for knapsack-unit to the multi-demand setting. How-
ever, there are several difficulties. First, in the ks-unit-sample algorithm for knapsack-unit, in
order to use the probabilistic lemma, we need to bound the maximum value of a single item. This
is sufficient for knapsack-unit since we choose at most one item from an agent. For knapsack-
mul, however, we need to bound the total contribution of a single agent in order to use the lemma.
Therefore, we need to employ one more mechanism to handle such single agent. But how can we
choose the agent? This raises the second difficulty: The computation of the optimal solution for a
single agent is NP-hard (it is equivalent to solving the knapsack problem). On the other hand, if
we use the greedy algorithm, the mechanism may not be truthful.
To overcome these difficulties, we use the fractional optimal solution which can be computed
by the greedy algorithm plus a fraction of the first item that the greedy does not pick so that the
aggregate capacity is equal to the full capacity. We first ignore all items with capacity larger than
C
2 . Then for each agent we compute the fractional optimal solution with total capacity smaller
than or equal to C2 and choose the best solution over all agents. There is one nice property of
the fractional optimal solution provided by the greedy rule: there is at most one item which is
fractionally picked. We will include this item with a probability equal to its share in the fractional
optimal solution. The mechanism is given below.
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ks-mul-large-agent
• Remove all items with capacity cj > C2 .
• For each agent i, compute the fractional optimal solution Fi with total
capacity at most C2 .
• Choose an agent i∗ with the largest value of Fi.
• Assume the fractional solution Fi∗ is composed of
– a subset of items X that are fully picked,
– an item j that is picked with a share 0 < α < 1.
• Output
– X at probability 1− α;
– X ∪ {j} at probability α.
We note that since we reserve half of the total capacity and the size of each item is not more than
C
2 , including the last item j still gives a feasible solution. In addition, by making the probability
equal to the share of the item j, the agent’s expected utility is the same as his fractional optimal
value. This ensures the truthfulness (in expectation) for the agent.
Claim B.2. ks-mul-large-agent is a truthful in expectation mechanism.
Proof. No agent can enlarge his fractional optimal solution by reporting smaller set. The agent
i∗ does not have any incentive to lie since his expected revenue is exactly his value for Fi∗ and
she may not increase this value by lying. Any other agent cannot get anything, since she only is
allowed to decrease the size of reported set. Therefore, mechanism is truthful-in-expectation.
There is a similar difficulty in extending ks-unit-sample to the multi-unit demand setting:
The greedy algorithm may not be truthful for the agents in R. Again the similar idea of fractional
optimal solution helps us to get round this difficulty.
ks-mul-sample(λ)
1. Delete all items with capacity cj >
C
λ .
2. Pick each agent with probability 12 into group T; let R be the remaining agents.
3. Run the greedy algorithm for T; let V be the total value of the solution.
4. For each agent in R, remove all his items with
vj
cj
< V2C .
5. Let S ← ∅ and C˜ = C − Cλ .
6. For each agent i ∈ R on a fixed order
(a) Compute the fractional optimal solution Fi for the items of agent i within
the capacity C˜ − c(S).
(b) Let Fi = X ∪ {j} where items in X are fully picked and j is only picked
with a share 0 < α < 1.
(c) With probability α, let S ← S∪X∪{j}; with probability 1−α, let S ← S∪X;
if α > 0 stop.
7. Output S.
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Notice that the final outcome S with certain probability may exceed the capacity C˜, but it is
always within the capacity C (this follows from the fact that we set C˜ = C − Cλ at the beginning).
Our mechanism for knapsack-mul is as follows.
ks-mul-mechanism
1. With probability 13, choose a single item with the largest value.
2. With probability 13, run ks-mul-large-agent.
3. With probability 13, run ks-mul-sample(λ).
Theorem B.2. ks-mul-mechanism is truthful in expectation and has a constant approximation
ratio for knapsack-mul.
Proof. The truthfulness for the first part where we choose a single item with the largest value is
straightforward. Truthfulness for ks-mul-large-agent has been shown in Claim B.2. The similar
argument works for ks-mul-sample(λ) as well.
By scaling all values simultaneously, without loss of generality we may assume that the optimal
value is 1. If there exists a single item with value at least 14λ , then we are done, since with probability
at least 13 we will pick either this item or better in the output.
In the following we assume that the value of any single item is at most 14λ . Let OPT be the
optimal solution and v(OPT ) be its value. Consider the possible contribution of a single agent
to OPT. If there exists an agent who contributes at least 12λ to OPT, then after removing of all
his items with capacity larger than C2 , at most one of his items from OPT has been removed.
Therefore, his contribution to OPT will be still at least 12λ − 14λ = 14λ . Then the value returned by
ks-mul-large-agent is at least 18λ . We are also done.
It remains to consider the case where the contribution of any single agent to OPT is at most
1
2λ . We next will prove that ks-mul-sample(λ) contributes a constant value. By removing all the
items with capacity larger than Cλ , we could remove at most λ items from OPT and the value of
remaining items in OPT is at least 1 − λ · 14λ = 34 . Hence, it is sufficient to prove that ks-mul-
sample(λ) has a constant approximation ratio providing that every item has size less than or equal
to Cλ and every agent contributes less than
1
2λ to the optimal solution.
The rest of the proof is similar to that of Theorem B.1, and thus, is omitted here. We conclude
that ks-mul-mechanism has a constant approximation.
C Generalized Assignment Problem
C.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof. Since sm-greedy is truthful, it suffices to show that sm-da-alg is truthful as well. For
all four invariant settings, the process of the sm-da-alg has the following nice property: Once i
and k are matched, the assignment will never be broken. We will prove this only for the job value
invariant setting; the arguments for the job capacity invariant and machine capacity invariant
settings are similar. We consider the first pair picked by the algorithm, i and k. According to the
algorithm, the ratio given by the first assigned pair, vikcik , is the largest possible among all ratios.
Since every job has the same value vi for all machines, all jobs are essentially indifferent between all
machines. Thus machine k has the highest rank in Li. Therefore, after job i is assigned to machine
k, the assignment will never be broken. We can then apply the same argument iteratively for all
assigned pairs. (The argument for the machine value invariant setting is slightly different: Since all
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jobs have the same value for every machine, all of them have the same preference over machines.
Hence, the algorithm runs in such a way that all jobs try to fill the machine that they prefer most,
according to the increasing order of their capacities, then move on to the next machine, and so on.)
Given the above property, we know that the assignment returned by the algorithm is stable, and
the algorithm runs in a greedy manner. Therefore, it is truthful for all jobs.
Next we will prove that the approximation ratio of the mechanism is 4. We denote by A(1), A(2)
the assignments we get from sm-greedy and sm-da-alg, respectively, and by Aopt the optimal
assignment.
The expected value of the mechanism is given by 12v(A(1)) + 12v(A(2)). We want to show that
4 ·
(
1
2
v
(A(1))+ 1
2
v
(A(2))) = 2v(A(1))+ 2v(A(2)) ≥ v(Aopt).
We denote by S the set of jobs i for which v
(Aopti ) > v(A(1)i ) and v(Aopti ) > v(A(2)i ). Then,
we get ∑
i
v
(A(1)i )+∑
i
v
(A(2)i ) ≥∑
i/∈S
v
(Aopti ).
Further, we have v(Aopt) = ∑
i/∈S
v
(Aopti )+ ∑
i∈S
v
(Aopti ) = ∑
i/∈S
v
(Aopti )+∑
k
v
(
Aoptk ∩ S
)
.
Now consider any job i0 ∈ S; let Aopti0 = k. By the definition of S, we know that in both
assignments A(1) and A(2), job i0 prefers machine k to its actual assignments. Therefore, for A(1),
by the greedy rule, we have v
(A(1)k ) ≥ vik = v(Aopti ) for any i ∈ Aoptk ∩ S.
For A(2), by the property of stability, for any i ∈ Aoptk ∩S, we have (i) v
(Aopti ) ≤ c(Aopti )v(A(2)i′ )c(A(2)
i′
)
for each i′ ∈ A(2)k , and (ii) Ck < c
(A(2)k )+ c(Aopti ), since we cannot add i to A(2)k . Then we get
v
(
Aopti
)
≤ c
(
Aopti
) ∑i∈A(2)k v
(
A(2)i
)
∑
i∈A(2)k
c
(
A(2)i
) = c(Aopti ) v
(
A(2)k
)
c
(
A(2)k
) .
For the considered job i0 ∈ Aoptk ∩ S, we can write
v
((Aoptk ∩ S) \ {i0}) = ∑
i∈Aoptk ∩S
i 6=i0
v
(
Aopti
)
≤ c
((Aoptk ∩ S) \ {i0}) v
(
A(2)k
)
c
(
A(2)k
) ≤ v (A(2)k ) ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact c
((Aoptk ∩ S) \ {i0}) ≤ Ck − c(Aopti0 ) < c(A(2)k ).
Then we have v
(
A(1)k
)
+ v
(
A(2)k
)
≥ v
((Aoptk ∩ S) \ {i0}) + v(Aopti0 ) = v(Aoptk ∩ S). Hence,∑
k
v
(
A(1)k
)
+
∑
k
v
(
A(2)k
)
≥∑
k
v
(Aoptk ∩ S).
Therefore, we have
2v
(A(1))+ 2v(A(2)) = ∑
i
v
(
A(1)i
)
+
∑
i
v
(
A(2)i
)
+
∑
k
v
(
A(1)k
)
+
∑
k
v
(
A(2)k
)
≥
∑
i/∈S
v
(
Aopti
)
+
∑
k
v
(
Aoptk ∩ S
)
= v(Aopt).
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This completes the proof.
C.2 Example for sm-da-alg
The following example shows that the sm-da-alg is not necessarily truthful for the general gap.
Example C.1. There are four jobs {1, 2, 3, 4} and three machines {x, y, z}. The values, capacities,
and preferences of compatible pairs are given by the following table:
Job 1 Job 2 Job 3 Job 4
Values v1x = 1, v1y = 0.5 v2x = 1, v2z = 0.5 v3x = 10, v3z = 20 v4x = 5, v4y = 0.1Jobs
Capacities c1x = 0.5, c1y = 1 c2x = 0.5, c2z = 1 c3x = 1, c3z = 100 c4x = 1, c4y = 1
Preferences L1 : x > y L2 : x > z L3 : z > x L4 : x > y
Machine x Machine y Machine z
Machines Capacities Cx = 1 Cy = 1 Cz = 100
Preferences Lx : {3} > {4} > {1 = 2} Ly : {1} > {4} Lz : {2} > {3}
If all agents report their true information, jobs 1 and 2 propose to x, and job 3 proposes to z; then
job 4 proposes to x, which kicks jobs 1 and 2 off to y and z, respectively. Job 3 is kicked off by
2 then and next proposes to x, which kicks job 4 off. Hence, job 4 does not get any assignment
eventually. However, if job 4 hides x and only reports machine y, then he will get y by the stable
matching algorithm. Therefore, the stable matching algorithm is not truthful for the general gap.
C.3 Analysis of gap-mechanism-1(λ), gap-mechanism-2(λ), gap-mechanism-3(λ, µ)
Claim C.1. gap-mechanism-1(λ) is a truthful mechanism. Further, for any instance where all
pairs (i, k) satisfy cik ≥ 1λCk, its approximation ratio is at most 2λ.
Proof. For truthfulness, reporting pairs with cik <
1
λCk will not change anything in the mechanism.
Therefore, we may restrict ourselves to the setting only with pairs cik ≥ 1λCk. Then the greedy
strategy to pick job-machine pairs implies truthfulness for all jobs.
Consider the optimal assignment Aopt of jobs to machines. Note that for each machine k we
have
∣∣Aoptk ∣∣ ≤ λ (we recall that Aoptk is the set of jobs that machine k is assigned to). Let A be the
assignment generated by our mechanism. Let us consider a pair (i, k) in Aoptk with the highest value
vik. Let v (Ai) and v(Aopti ) be the values of the assignments of job i in A and Aopt, respectively.
In the assignment A, there are two possibilities for job i:
• either v(Ai) ≥ v(Aopti )
• or v(Ai) < v(Aopti ). For the latter case, by the greedy rule, machine k should be assigned in
A to a job with a value greater than or equal to vik.
Hence, we have
2v(A) =
∑
k
∑
i∈Ak
vik +
∑
k
v(Ak) ≥
∑
k
max
i∈Aoptk
vik ≥ 1
λ
v(Aopt).
Therefore, 2λ · v(A) ≥ v(Aopt) and the claim follows.
Claim C.2. gap-mechanism-2(λ) is a truthful mechanism.
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Proof. Observe that reporting pairs with cik >
1
λCk will not change anything in the mechanism.
Therefore, we may restrict ourselves to the setting only with pairs cik ≤ 1λCk. Note that the value
λ, i.e., the number of jobs that each machine can take, is independent of the bids of all jobs. Thus,
the greedy strategy to pick job-machine pairs implies truthfulness for all jobs.
Claim C.3. gap-mechanism-3(λ, µ) is a universally truthful mechanism.
Proof. While gap-mechanism-3(λ, µ) is not deterministic, it does not use any reported informa-
tion from jobs to generate the testing group T . Once T is generated, the mechanism performs
deterministically. Therefore, it runs on a distribution over deterministic mechanisms. Further,
notice that every job in the testing group T derives utility zero. Therefore, given the fixed set
T , none of the jobs in T can benefit from reporting untruthfully. On the other hand, for each
remaining job i ∈ R, reporting the truth preference maximizes its utility, since jobs are processed
one by one in a fixed given order and every time we search for the best possible assignment for the
processed job. (Note that the threshold value tk is computed according to the outcome of AT from
the testing group T ; thus it is independent of the bids of any job in R.)
Claim C.4. The assignment AT returned by the mechanism gap-mechanism-3(λ, µ) is stable with
respect to all jobs in T and all machines with virtual capacity λ−1λ Ck.
Proof. Assume the contrary, that i and k form a blocking pair, where i strictly prefers k to Ai
and k can get a better assignment from jobs in Ak ∪ {i} (with respect to the virtual capacity
constraint). Since every job proposes according to its preference list Li, we know that at a certain
step job i has proposed to k during the execution of the algorithm. Then either i got rejected right
away, or got assigned but rejected later (due to proposals from other jobs). For both cases, from
that moment until the end of the algorithm, because the capacity of all considered pairs is at most
1
λCk, we know that (i) the total capacity of the assigned jobs to k is strictly larger than the virtual
capacity λ−1λ Ck (and, of course, less than or equal to the real capacity Ck), and (ii) k prefers every
assigned job to i. These two facts imply that k cannot get a better assignment from Ak ∪ {i}, a
contradiction.
C.4 Approximation Analysis of gap-mechanism-main
Let OPT be the optimal allocation. We denote by A(1), A(2) and A(3) the allocations ob-
tained in the mechanisms gap-mechanism-1(λ), gap-mechanism-2(λ) and gap-mechanism-
3(λ, µ), respectively. The expected value of the mechanism gap-mechanism-main is therefore
1
3
(
v(A(1)) + v(A(2)) + v(A(3))).
We divide all pairs into two groups: a large group containing the pairs (i, k) with cik >
Ck
λ , and
a small group containing the remaining pairs. Let OPT small and OPT large denote the optimal allo-
cations for the settings restricted on the jobs only in the small group and large group, respectively.
Then we have
v(OPT ) ≤ v(OPT small) + v(OPT large).
By Claim C.1, we know that the total value derived from gap-mechanism-1(λ) satisfies
v(A(1)) ≥ v(OPT large)2λ . It remains to handle OPT small. Instead of dealing with OPT small di-
rectly, we consider the allocation A∗ defined according to Step 2 of gap-mechanism-3(λ, µ) for all
jobs with respect to the pairs with capacities less than or equal to Ckλ . Formally, A∗ is defined as
follows:
1. Remove all pairs (i, k) with capacity cik >
Ck
λ .
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2. For each job i, let Li be his preference list over machines.
3. For each machine k, let Lk be its preference list over jobs.
4. Run the sm-da-alg with virtual capacity λ−1λ Ck for each machine k.
5. Denote the generated assignment by A∗.
Similar to the proof of Claim C.4, A∗ is a stable assignment with respect to virtual capacity
λ−1
λ Ck. The following claim implies that v(A∗) is a constant approximation to v(OPT small).
Claim C.5. (2 + 1λ−1) · v(A∗) ≥ v(OPT small).
Proof. To simplify the notation, let Aopt denote the assignment OPT small. Since A∗ is a stable
assignment, for each pair (i, k) ∈ Aopt \ A∗, we have either (i) v(Aopti ) = vik ≤ v (A∗i ), or (ii)
vik
cik
≤ vi′kci′k , for every i
′ ∈ A∗k, and c(A∗k) ≥ Ck λ−1λ . The latter implies that vikcik ≤
v(A∗k)
c(A∗k) ≤
v(A∗k)
Ck
λ
λ−1 .
In the assignment Aopt, we denote by X the set of jobs i such that v(Aopti ) ≤ v(A∗i ) and by Y
the remaining jobs. Then we have
v(Aopt) =
∑
i∈X
v(Aopti ) +
∑
k
v(Aoptk ∩ Y )
≤
∑
i∈X
v(A∗i ) +
λ
λ− 1
∑
k
v(A∗k)
Ck
∑
i∈Aoptk ∩ Y
cik
≤ v(A∗) + λ
λ− 1
∑
k
v(A∗k)
=
(
1 +
λ
λ− 1
)
v(A∗).
Hence, we get v(Aopt) ≤ (2 + 1λ−1)v(A∗).
In addition, by stability A∗ enjoys the following useful properties.
Claim C.6. For each job i ∈ T and machine k, we have
1. v(ATi ) ≥ v(A∗i ).
2. v(ATk ) ≤ λλ−1v(A∗k).
Proof. Our proof of the claim exploits similar ideas from the standard one-to-one stable matching.
Note that both assignments A∗ and AT are generated by the same algorithm, but A∗ is on a bigger
set of jobs. Similar to the proof of Claim C.4, the virtual capacity λ−1λ Ck and the fact that all
considered pairs have capacities cik ≤ Ckλ ensure that at any moment of the algorithm, the set of
assigned jobs to any machine is simply the best possible subset selected from the set of all jobs that
have ever proposed to the machine up to that moment. In particular, at the end of the algorithm,
every machine k will have its most preferred feasible set (given the virtual capacity constraint)
chosen from the set of all proposals that k has ever received.
For each job i, denote by best(i) the best possible assignment for i taken over all stable assign-
ments. We will argue that the sm-da-alg will assign every job i to best(i). Assume otherwise,
since every job makes proposals by decreasing order of Li, in the course of the algorithm, there
must be a job i that has been rejected by best(i). We consider the first moment in the algorithm
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when a job i is rejected from the machine k = best(i). At that moment, let S be the set of jobs
that are assigned to k. By the above argument, we know that for any i′ ∈ S, k prefers i′ to i.
Next consider a stable assignment A′, where i is assigned to k (by the definition of best(i), such
assignment exists). Then there exists i′ ∈ S that is not assigned to k in A′; let A′i′ = k′( 6= k).
By the definition of best(i′), we know that i′ weakly prefers best(i′) to k′. Since A′ is a stable
assignment, i′ and k do not form a blocking pair, which implies that i′ prefers k′ to k. Now we
recall that i is the first job rejected from the machine best(i) in sm-da-alg; we know that at that
moment, i′ has not been rejected by best(i′). Hence, i′ weakly prefers k to best(i′). Therefore, on
the preference Li′ , we have the following preference order: k  best(i′)  k′  k, which gives a
contradiction. Therefore, each job i is assigned to best(i) in the output of sm-da-alg.
Note that the above argument does not rely on any specific order of proposals (especially, the
one defined in Step 1 of sm-da-alg). That is, an arbitrary order of proposals, as long as every
job proposes to the most preferred machine that he has not proposed yet, will lead to the same
assignment by matching every job i to best(i). Now given that the order in which jobs propose
does not matter for the outcome of the algorithm, in the computation of A∗, we may consider the
order where jobs in T are settled first and then add the remaining jobs. Thus, for each job i ∈ T
the assignment A∗i can only be worse than in ATi , i.e., v(ATi ) ≥ v(A∗i ).
In addition, we know that the set of jobs proposed to each machine k in AT is a subset in A∗.
Thus, by the above argument, the average ratio vikcik of the assigned jobs in A∗k is larger than or
equal to that in ATk . Notice that in the assignment ATk , the total capacity used is at most Ck. For
the assignment A∗k, either we use more than (1 − 1λ)Ck capacity or otherwise (which implies that
ATk ⊆ A∗k). For either case, we have v(ATk ) ≤ λλ−1v(A∗k), which completes the proof.
For the assignment A∗, let us consider a restricted assignment A˜∗, where we only keep the first
λ largest value jobs of A∗ for each machine k. Note that A˜∗ is a feasible assignment for the setting
in gap-mechanism-2 as well. We have the following claim.
Claim C.7. v
(A(2)) ≥ 12v(A˜∗).
Proof. Observe that both A(2) and A˜∗ run on the same set pairs, i.e., cik ≤ Ckλ . We may split each
machine into λ equal slots, where each slot can take only one job. Thus, A˜∗ may be viewed as
a matching and A(2) as a maximal matching for the new setting between jobs and slots. Since a
maximal matching is a 2 approximation to the maximum matching, which is an upper bound on
v
(A˜∗), we have 2 · v(A(2)) ≥ v(A˜∗).
Before continuing the proof, we first establish the following probabilistic fact.
Lemma C.1. Let δ1 ≤ 136 be a positive real number. Let a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ a` ≥ 0 be real numbers
with the sum a = a1 + a2 + . . .+ a`. Assume a1 < δ1a. Consider the following probabilistic event:
One selects each number a1, . . . , a` independently at random with probability 1/2 each; let b be the
random variable denoting the summation of the selected numbers. Then
Pr
(
1
3
a < b <
2
3
a
)
≥ 3
4
.
Proof. Let us consider for each 1 ≤ j ≤ `, the random variables Xj with Pr(Xj = 0) = Pr(Xj =
aj) = 0.5. Let X =
∑`
i=j
Xj ; we have b = X. Then the expectation E(X) =
a
2 and variance
σ2 = Var(X) =
∑`
j=1
Var(Xj) =
1
4
∑`
j=1
a2j .
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Applying Chebyshev’s inequality, we get
Pr
(∣∣∣X − a
2
∣∣∣ ≥ 2σ) ≤ 1
4
.
In order to conclude the proof of the lemma, it remains to show that 2σ ≤ a6 , which is equivalent
to show that
36 · (a21 + a22 + . . .+ a2`) ≤ (a1 + a2 + . . .+ a`)2 .
Since a ≥ a1δ1 ≥
aj
δ1
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ `, we have
(a1 + a2 + . . .+ a`)
2 =
∑`
j=1
aj · a ≥
∑`
j=1
a2j
δ1
≥ 36
∑`
j=1
a2j .
Therefore, the lemma follows.
Consider the partition of jobs into the two sets T and R in the gap-mechanism-3(λ, µ). For a
fixed machine k, we consider the jobs A∗k ∩ T and A∗k ∩R. By the definition of T and R, every job
in A∗k will be placed in T with probability 1/2. Recall that A˜∗k keeps the top λ value jobs in A∗k.
Depending on the relation between v(A˜∗k) and v(A∗k), at least one of the following alternatives has
to be true (where the latter follows from the above Lemma C.1):
1. v(A˜∗k) ≥ δ1v(A∗k),
2. PrT
(
1
3v(A∗k) ≤ v(A∗k ∩ T ) ≤ 23v(A∗k)
)
≥ 34 .
Intuitively, if there are many similar jobs in A∗k, then with a high probability the total value of
jobs in A∗k ∩ T and in A∗k ∩ R will be close to each other. On the other hand, if the former does
not hold, the gap-mechanism-2 gives us a good value for machine k. Let us denote the set of the
machines satisfying the condition v(A˜∗k) ≥ δ1v(A∗k) by G and the remaining set of machines by H.
Thus, by Claim C.7, gap-mechanism-2 guarantees that we get a constant fraction of the total
value of A∗ taken over all machines in G. For every machine k ∈ H, Lemma C.1 ensures that
1
3
v(A∗k) ≤ v(A∗k ∩ T ) ≤
2
3
v(A∗k)
occurs with a probability of at least 3/4. Consider the collection D∗k of realizations of T for which the
above two inequalities hold; by abusing the notation, let D∗k denote the distribution of T restricted
to the collection as well.
Now let us estimate the value we get from gap-mechanism-3(λ, µ) over H. For each machine
k ∈ H, there are the following two cases.
1. In gap-mechanism-3(λ, µ), we have rejected a job at machine k due to the capacity con-
straint, that is, we have rejected a pair (i, k) because of cik + c(Ak) > Ck. Since gap-
mechanism-3(λ, µ) only considers pairs with capacities less than or equal to Ckλ , in that case
almost all the capacity of k is used. That is,∑
i∈A(3)k
cik ≥ Ck
(
1− 1
λ
)
.
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Further, by the rule of the mechanism, for every i ∈ A(3)k , we have vikcik ≥ tk, i.e., vik ≥
cik
µ·v(ATk )
Ck
. Let δ2 = µ(1− 1λ) > 0; therefore, we have
v(A(3)k ) ≥
∑
i∈A(3)k
cik
µ · v(ATk )
Ck
≥ µ
(
1− 1
λ
)
v(ATk ) = δ2 · v(ATk ). (1)
2. No job who has passed the threshold tk has been rejected from machine k in gap-mechanism-
3(λ, µ). Denote by R+ the set of jobs inR who have passed the threshold for the corresponding
machine in assignment A∗; denote by R− the remaining jobs in R. Therefore, all jobs in
A∗k ∩ R+ get at least as good an assignment as in A∗. Then for any i ∈ A∗k ∩ R+ we have
v(A(3)i ) ≥ v(A∗i ).
Further, for each job i ∈ A∗k ∩R−, we have
vik < ciktk = µ
v(ATk )cik
Ck
.
Therefore,
v(A∗k ∩R−) ≤ µ · v(ATk )
∑
i∈A∗k∩R− cik
Ck
≤ µ · v(ATk ) ≤ µ
λ
λ− 1v(A
∗
k)
where the last inequality follows from Claim C.6. Thus,∑
i∈A∗k∩R
v(A(3)i ) ≥
∑
i∈A∗k∩R+
v(A(3)i ) ≥ v(A∗k ∩R)− µ
λ
λ− 1v(A
∗
k).
Let δ3 =
1
3 − µ λλ−1 . Taking appropriate values for λ and µ, we can ensure that δ3 > 0. For
any T ∈ D∗k, we have v(A∗k ∩R) ≥ 13v(A∗k); then we get∑
i∈A∗k∩R
v(A(3)i ) ≥
(
1
3
− µ λ
λ− 1
)
v(A∗k) = δ3 · v(A∗k). (2)
Next we estimate the expectation of v(A(3)). Let D denote the distribution of the mechanism
gap-mechanism-3(λ, µ) to generate T .
ET∼D
(
2 · v
(
A(3)
))
= ET∼D
(∑
k
v
(
A(3)k
)
+
∑
k
∑
i∈A∗k∩R
v
(
A(3)i
))
≥
∑
k∈H
ET∼D
(
v
(
A(3)k
)
+
∑
i∈A∗k∩R
v
(
A(3)i
))
≥
∑
k∈H
Pr(T ∈ D∗k) ·ET∼D∗k
(
v
(
A(3)k
)
+
∑
i∈A∗k∩R
v
(
A(3)i
))
.
The last inequality follows from the fact that for any random variable ξ(t), one has
Ex
(
ξ(x)
)
= Pr(x | Z) ·Ex:x∈Z
(
ξ(x)
)
+Pr
(
x | Z) ·Ex:x∈Z(ξ(x)).
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We continue the argument; by applying either (1) or (2), we have
ET∼D
(
2 · v
(
A(3)
))
≥
∑
k∈H
Pr(T ∈ D∗k) ·ET∼D∗k min
(
δ2 · v
(ATk ) , δ3 · v (A∗k))
≥ min
(
δ2,
(λ− 1)δ3
λ
)
·
∑
k∈H
Pr(T ∈ D∗k) ·ET∼D∗k
(
v
(ATk ) )
where the last inequality follows from Claim C.6. Let δ4 = min
(
δ2,
(λ−1)δ3
λ
)
> 0.
Recall that
ET∼D
(
v(ATk )
)
= Pr(T ∈ D∗k) ·ET∼D∗k
(
v(ATk )
)
+Pr(T /∈ D∗k) ·ET∼D\D∗k
(
v(ATk )
)
.
Since Pr(T /∈ D∗k) ≤ 14 , by Claim C.6, which says that v(ATk ) ≤ λλ−1v(A∗k), for each k ∈ H we get
Pr(T ∈ D∗k) ·ET∼D∗k
(
v(ATk )
)
≥ ET∼D
(
v(ATk )
)
− 1
4
λ
λ− 1v(A
∗
k). (3)
We continue our lower bound on ET∼D
(
2 · v (A(3)) ); by applying (3), we have
ET∼D
(
2 · v
(
A(3)
))
≥ δ4 ·
∑
k∈H
(
ET∼D
(
v
(ATk ) )− λ4(λ− 1)v (A∗k)
)
≥ δ4 ·
∑
k∈H
ET∼D
(
v
(ATk ) )− δ4 · λ4(λ− 1)v (A∗)
≥ δ4 ·
∑
k
ET∼D
(
v
(ATk ) )− δ4 · λλ− 1 ∑
k∈G
v (A∗k)− δ4 ·
λ
4(λ− 1)v (A
∗) .
By using the first property of Claim C.6, we have∑
k
ET∼D
(
v(ATk )
)
= ET∼D
(
v
(AT ) ) = ET∼D∑
i∈T
v
(ATi )
≥ ET∼D
∑
i∈T
v (A∗i ) =
1
2
· v (A∗) .
Then we have the following lower bound:
ET∼D
(
v
(A(3))) ≥ δ4 · (1
4
− λ
8(λ− 1)
)
v (A∗)− δ4λ
2(λ− 1) ·
∑
k∈G
v (A∗k) . (4)
Let δ5 = δ4 ·
(
1
4 − λ8(λ−1)
)
. Taking an appropriate value for λ, we can ensure that δ4, δ5 > 0.
Recall the definition of group G and what we already got for v
(A(2)) by Claim C.7:
v
(
A(2)
)
≥ 1
2
· v
(
A˜∗
)
≥ δ1
2
·
∑
k∈G
v (A∗k) .
Taking appropriate values for δ1 and δ4 (such that
δ1
2 ≥ δ4λ2(λ−1)), we have
ET∼D
(
v
(A(3)))+ v(A(2)) ≥ δ5 · v (A∗) .
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Finally, the expected value of the gap-mechanism-main(λ, µ) satisfies
1
3
·
(
v
(A(1))+ v(A(2))+ET∼D(v(A(3))))
≥ 1
3
·
(
1
2λ
v
(
OPT large
)
+
δ5
2 + 1λ−1
· v
(
OPT small
))
≥ 1
3
·min
(
1
2λ
,
δ5
2 + 1λ−1
)
· v (OPT ) .
By choosing, e.g., λ = 3, µ = 16 and δ1 =
1
36 , it can be seen that all conditions for δ2, δ3, δ4, δ5 are
satisfied. Hence, gap-mechanism-main gives a constant approximation. This completes the proof
of Theorem 5.2.
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